Introduction
Born from the same imperial reordering of the Middle East, Jordan and Egypt have since embodied two contrasting models of postcolonial governance, one defined by monarchical continuity and the other by revolutionary upheaval and military dominance. After World War I, the Middle East experienced a major transformation as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres, formalized at the San Remo Conference, was a significant document that outlined the partition of the states that fell under the Ottoman Empire and was signed in 1920, redistributing Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) territories among Western powers.[1] This division of territories led to the establishment of British mandates over Jordan, then known as Transjordan, as well as Egypt, shaping their political structures and the institutional foundation of their systems. Jordan has maintained a semblance of regime stability through centralized monarchical authority, strategic patronage networks, and calibrated political reform, whereas Egypt still grapples with persistent conflicts, including civil uprisings, and experiences with both political and economic fragmentation. Thus, the question arises: why have Jordan and Egypt followed such divergent post-independence political trajectories, with Jordan maintaining relative stability and Egypt continuing to experience conflict and fragmentation? The contrast lies in the differing nature of their governing authority, the degree of military influence on the state, and the management of socio-economic conditions, as Egypt’s strong military and volatile economic structure have undermined political cohesion, while Jordan’s monarchy has sustained stability through controlled power-sharing and adaptive economic strategies.
Type of Governing Power: Monarchy vs Republic Governments
A notable difference between Jordan and Egypt lies in their form of government, with one state being a monarchy, and the other a republic. The contrast between their political systems highlights how the states developed in different ways, paving the way for stability or instability within each nation. The Jordanian monarchy’s history dates back to the British establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, when Abdullah I was given the title of Emir, marking the beginning of the monarchy’s lineage.[2]
When Transjordan gained independence from British colonial rule in 1946, it became known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. There was no revolutionary action that led to this development. Understanding this historical background is essential in comprehending the foundations of the Jordanian monarchy.
Egypt, on the other hand, became a republic through revolutionary action, seeing as the state’s monarchy was overthrown as a result of the Revolution in 1952.[3] Although Egypt formally gained independence in 1922, British influence persisted, making the 1952 Revolution the decisive break from colonial rule. The revolutionary movement was driven by discontent and national desire to address the challenges faced by the general population, which ended up shaping Egypt’s political system. The revolution was described as “a national [movement] against an incompetent monarch and a parliament that had failed to end British rule and brought immiseration to the countryside.”[4] The clear and apparent recurring discontentment with the Egyptian political and governance system continues to make the state weaker and more vulnerable to transnational as well as international criticism.
On the other hand, monarchies tend to resist uprisings and revolutionary movements. Because dynastic systems concentrate authority and institutionalize succession, they provide greater continuity in leadership and foreign policy. This continuity makes monarchies, such as Jordan, appear more predictable and strategically reliable to great powers like the United States, increasing the likelihood of sustained diplomatic and security support.[5] Such external backing reinforces regime security and deters external threats. In contrast, republics that experience leadership turnover through revolutionary mobilization may generate uncertainty in foreign policy direction. Egypt’s recurring political transitions have contributed to periodic shifts in governance and external alignment, reducing its predictability as an international partner.[6] These differences in institutional stability and external perception contribute to divergent levels of regime durability.
The differences between Jordan’s monarchy and Egypt’s republic show how a country’s type of government can affect its stability through relations with other countries and the ability to handle obstacles. Jordan’s monarchy provides a steady government and strong international relationships, which help the country stay stable. On the other hand, Egypt’s republic often struggles with stability because its leaders and policies frequently change due to constant revolutionary action. The governance type in both Jordan and Egypt has a significant impact on both national and international dynamics.
Level of Military Influence and Power Within The State
It is extremely important to note that while the 1952 Egyptian Revolution brought about the end of the monarchy, it also brought forth a new era of military rule. Military control within the state has affected Egypt’s political stability, highlighting issues of political repression and limited democratic development. The revolution was led by the Free Officers Movement, a group of junior officers within the Egyptian army who, motivated by a combination of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and a desire for social and political reform, overthrew the monarchic government with a coup. Most citizens supported the coup against the monarchy, as many were against the foreign British influence on the Egyptian state and believed the Free Officers would address their socio-economic concerns.[7] The 1952 Revolution set Egypt on a path-dependent trajectory, as the early consolidation of military authority shaped the country’s political development for decades to follow. By establishing a republic under military control, the new regime embedded the armed forces at the center of decision-making and policy formulation, a position that continues to influence Egypt’s political discourse to this day. Although Egypt’s military is hierarchical and centralized, it struggles to effectively manage the complexities of modern state governance and often lacks the ability to negotiate and compromise, making the state politically unstable.[8]
On the contrary, the military has notably less influence and power in Jordan. Executive authority in Jordan remains centralized in the monarch, who governs alongside a limited advisory circle who “have access to the monarch and can influence critical decisions to be taken.”[9] The Jordanian military, known as the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), has never directly taken power through a coup, does not have an official role in governance, and the monarchy has remained the paramount authority for decades.[10] The Jordanian military’s recruitment strategy has significantly shaped national identity and expressions of nationalism, as it recruits disproportionately from tribal, rural, and East Jordanian communities, groups that have historically formed the monarchy’s core base of support.[11] This recruitment strategy intertwines military service with regime loyalty, reinforcing a national identity closely aligned with tribal affiliation and dynastic continuity. Rather than allowing the military to emerge as an autonomous political actor, the monarchy embeds it within a broader system of patronage and ethnonational legitimacy. As a result, the armed forces function as a stabilizing pillar of the regime rather than a competing center of power. Another reason the Jordanian military does not overtly engage in governance or coups is because the King of Jordan maintains a relationship with the military, paying them regular visits and thanking them personally. Additionally, the King is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, which forces a sense of loyalty to the monarchy upon those serving. This loyalty is a significant source of power for the monarchy, as it secures the military’s support in maintaining order and protecting the current ongoing structure of governance.
By comparing military influence in Egypt and Jordan, it becomes clear that armed forces can decisively shape a state’s political development. In Egypt, military-led governance has constrained democratic growth and entrenched authoritarian dominance. In contrast, Jordan’s more contained arrangement keeps the military supportive of the regime without allowing it to dominate decision-making. These contrasting cases illustrate how the degree of military autonomy within the state can either destabilize political institutions or reinforce regime continuity.
Socio-Economic Factors and Revolutions
Socio-economic factors contribute greatly to the likelihood of revolutionary action and impact a state’s stability. Following Egypt’s 1952 Revolution, protests continued to emerge over the decades, particularly as the military consolidated itself as a central governing force. This pattern did not end in 2011, even after the initial success of the Arab Spring uprising. Large numbers of Egyptians returned to the streets, expressing dissatisfaction with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and later political leadership. The recurrence of protests suggests that revolutionary momentum did not translate into structural stability. A commentary article that was released in 2011 summarizes Egypt’s revolution cycle briefly: “…Egypt’s new normal. Protesters protest. The regime grants concessions. Protesters protest again. And so on.”[12] The revolutionary attempts to democratize Egypt have only led to temporary solutions and, consequently, more discontentment. Charles Tilly argues that processes of democracy can emerge from “categorical inequalities,” which are social categories of identification and distinctions between different citizens among a nation.[13] These categorical inequalities shape democratic trajectories by structuring who has access to power and resources, and Egypt demonstrates this dynamic through its deep socio-economic disparities. The Egyptian government tried to enhance the state’s economic activities by implementing policies aimed at redistributing wealth, reducing inequalities, and providing a wide array of public services and subsidies to the population.[14]
However, from the late 20th century onwards, Egypt, like many other developing countries, began to implement the reforms encouraged by international financial institutions (IFIs). While these reforms were intended to improve economic efficiency and competitiveness, their consequences on the nation have been adverse. The government reduced spending on essential services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure, directly undermining access, quality, and overall living conditions, particularly for lower-income populations. IFI-backed reforms in Egypt contributed to rising unemployment, declining public services, and widening economic inequality, intensifying public dissatisfaction with the regime. According to a 2024 Al-Jazeera report, “since January 2022, the Egyptian pound has lost around 50 percent of its value against the US dollar,” and “nearly 30 percent of Egyptians live in poverty.”[15] This inequality and dissatisfaction within the Egyptian population are one of the main drivers of revolution. In fact, the implementation of IFIs is referenced as one of the core causes of uprisings in Egypt, such as the Arab Spring.[16]
The Arab Spring highlighted the distinction between Egypt’s republic and Jordan’s monarchy, as Egypt experienced regime rupture while Jordan proved less susceptible to revolutionary waves. Although Jordan faced significant economic grievances, including official unemployment rates of 11.4 percent and unofficial estimates closer to 22 percent prior to the uprisings, protest demands did not escalate into calls for regime overthrow.[17] This stability partly stemmed from the monarchy’s avoidance of revolutionary nationalism. By responding to unrest through limited reform and controlled political concessions rather than allowing opposition movements to escalate into demands for regime overthrow, the regime preserved its authority and maintained continuity. In contrast, many republics, including Egypt, were shaped by revolutionary nationalism at their founding, which embedded regime legitimacy in rupture and made political systems more vulnerable to future cycles of mobilization and instability.[18] A key distinction between the Arab Spring protests in Jordan and Egypt was exemplified by the stance of Hamzah Mansur, secretary-general of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, who emphasized that while Egyptian demonstrators sought the removal of President Mubarak, Jordanian protesters, including himself, demanded only electoral reform and greater economic equality.[19] As a result, despite widespread unrest, Jordan remained relatively stable, with the monarchy responding through government reshuffling and controlled concessions rather than complete regime change. Jordan embarked on a path of democratization but ensured that it was limited.[20] The nation implemented controlled measures such as the opening of the Lower Chamber parliament seats to elections and creating avenues for greater citizen participation without putting the monarchy at complete risk. The Jordanian monarchy fulfilled the demands of the protestors in a restricted manner, maintaining stability within the state and fostering a sense of national unity.[21] On the other hand, Egypt’s authoritarian leaders entrenched a culture of corruption and repression, which could only be dismantled through complete regime change. This type of regime change was often abrupt, leading to more political instability.
The comparison between Jordan and Egypt’s revolutionary trajectories highlights the structural differences that shape national stability. Despite the need for more inclusive socio-economic policies in both countries, the Jordanian monarchy has addressed deep-seated inequalities through limited, state-managed reforms that preserve regime continuity. In contrast, Egypt’s governing institutions have historically failed to institutionalize public grievances within durable political frameworks, contributing to recurring cycles of protest and regime destabilization.
Conclusion
To conclude, by examining the divergent paths of Jordan and Egypt post-independence, it becomes evident that governance structures, military influence, and socio-economic factors significantly impact Jordan and Egypt’s political stability. Jordan’s monarchy has maintained continuity and managed unrest through a controlled balance between political authority, limited military influence, and gradual reforms. Egypt, meanwhile, has faced recurring instability as military dominance in politics and unresolved socio-economic inequalities continue to fuel public frustration and cycles of protest. These differences extend beyond a simple comparison of two states, demonstrating how foundational choices about political institutions, civil-military relations, and economic governance can set post-colonial nations on markedly different long-term trajectories. While both countries emerged from colonial rule, their differing experiences highlight the challenges and opportunities faced by post-colonial states in navigating the path to stability and political evolution. These contrasts ultimately raise a broader question: which foundational institutional choices enable durable stability, and which embed instability into the very structure of the state?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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