The Proxy of Two Centuries: Tracking Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s Motives for Intervention in Yemen from 1962 to 2015

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Introduction

Why do Middle Eastern states intervene in other Middle Eastern states’ civil wars? Yemen saw its first major instance of intervention in 1962, with the North Yemen Civil War, when royalist forces supporting Imam Muhammad al-Badr’s reign over the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, backed by Saudi Arabia, clashed with republican forces supporting the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), who were backed by Nasser’s Egypt.1 With chronic instability in between, Yemen faced its second major instance of foreign intervention on March 26, 2015, when Saudi Arabia, leading a coalition of Arab states, launched a military intervention to restore Sunni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi to power amid the country’s division between the pro-Hadi camp in the south and the Iran-backed Houthi faction in the north.2 Interventions in Yemen, despite often being framed as religiously motivated, ultimately reflect deeper power struggles rooted in post-colonial regional dynamics and global patron-client relationships. From the 1962 North Yemen Civil War to the 2015 Saudi-led interventions, religion and ideology function as a tool for achieving geopolitical dominance, rather than serve as ultimate goals. 

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This paper contends that Yemen’s civil wars serve as a microcosm of the broader patterns of Middle Eastern state interventions in civil wars. Analyzing how Middle Eastern states intervene in civil wars to support the leadership of respective religious sects, religious motivations are revealed to be surface-level justifications hiding the underlying goal of such interventions: regional hegemony in the post-colonial Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Ultimately, interventions are facilitated by international patrons, whose interventions in civil wars are essential to advancing their diplomatic goals without entering a full-scale war.

Historical Context of Yemen’s Two Major Civil Wars

Yemen’s history of civil war is rooted in post-independence struggles for political identity, leaving room for patron countries to use the situation as a battleground to implement their respective political identities.3 The first major civil war in Yemen began in 1962, shortly after the end of British colonial rule. Before this, Yemen was under the control of the Zaydi imamate, which increasingly faced opposition due to its hereditary nature.4 In the 1950s, sentiments of national liberation and modernization rose in Yemen, leading to the ascent of republican forces supported by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s secular, pan-Arab vision.5 On the other hand, royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia, supported Imam al-Badr to preserve the Zaydi imamate.6 The war thus became a two-level proxy struggle between royalist forces, supported by Saudi Arabia and funded by the United States and Britain, and republican forces, who were supported by Egypt and funded by the Soviet Union.7

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Yemen’s second civil war began after the Arab Spring ousted President Saleh in 2011. In 2012, Hadi replaced Saleh in a Gulf-sponsored transition.8 However, dissatisfaction with Hadi’s government led to widespread unrest, and by September 2014, the Houthi movement, a Shia group from the northern region, seized control of the capital, Sanaa.9 Subsequently, Yemen split into two factions: a Sunni-majority government loyal to Hadi in the south, and a Shia-majority Houthi faction in the north, supported by Saleh. In response, Saudi Arabia, leading a coalition of Arab states, launched “Operation Decisive Storm” on March 26, 2015.10 This military intervention aimed to restore Hadi to power and crush Houthi influence, which was perceived to be supported by Iran.11 The operation was part of the broader Iran-Saudi Arabia power struggle, with Saudi Arabia and its allies aiming to block Iran’s influence in Yemen via the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s intervention was framed as a defense of Yemen’s sovereignty and a means to counter what it viewed as Iranian expansionism in the region. Finally, it is important to clarify that while Egypt was using Yemen as a proxy against Saudi Arabia in 1962, it abandoned this strategy when it came to the 2015 Intervention. Rather, Egypt diplomatically supported Saudi Arabia with its attack on Houthis and politically endorsed the installation of Hadi.12 

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Thus, in both of Yemen’s civil wars, filling the ideological gap in the country was central to the patron countries’ aims and by extension those of the ideological factions which carry out their influence. In this sense, Yemen’s internal contest over governance and identity, namely monarchical versus republican in the 1960s and competing sectarian-political orders in the 2010s, created a vacuum that external powers sought to fill by backing local factions that reflected and advanced their own regional, ideological, and strategic agendas.

Sectarian Triumph: The Façade of MENA Interventions

Religion, or lack thereof, is one motivation that drives MENA states to intervene in each others’ civil wars. The goal of such intervention is often to install a leader who shares similar religious views, does not challenge the sectarian status quo, and does not threaten the existence of a sect-based state. This is exemplified by Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s involvement in the 1962 North Yemen Civil War, which serves as a microcosm of religiously motivated civil war intervention. 

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While religion played a role in shaping Saudi Arabia’s 1962 and 2015 interventions, it was not the sole driver in either case. On a surface level, Saudi Arabia’s support for the Yemeni monarchy during the 1962 North Yemen Civil War can be seen as a defensive measure to protect its religious values against the Nasserist-backed secular republicans from North Yemen, who aimed to establish a pan-Arab secular state along Saudi Arabia’s borders. After all, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, an alliance with a Zaydi Shiite monarchy—a branch of Islam that diverges from Wahhabi Sunnism primarily in its interpretation of leadership and Islamic jurisprudence—was preferable to the rise of an entirely secular republic. This would challenge not only Saudi Arabia’s Islamic identity, but also the religiously grounded status quo of monarchies in the region.13 From Nasser’s side, intertwining religion with the state was perceived to be an obstacle to pan-Arabist secular socialist ideology, as demonstrated by his crackdown on Muslim religious organizations in Egypt.14 Therefore, it was essential for Nasser to back a regime that lacked religion in its secular socialist governance system when the opportunity arose to support the republican forces in 1962; it was an addition to the ideological arsenal of Nasserism in the region. 

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The involvement of Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s civil war in 2015—along with those of other MENA nations—can be traced to their drive for religious triumph. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s interventions are deeply tied to their roles as custodians of competing Islamic ideologies, Wahhabism and Twelver Shiism respectively.15 The aforementioned religious doctrines are not merely theological; they have become the basis of governance in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and influence both their domestic and foreign policies.16 The Iran-Saudi rivalry demonstrates a clear intersection between religion and interventionist policies. Saudi Arabia, being home to Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, places a unique responsibility on its king, who is regarded as the “Custodian of the Faith.” His custodianship legitimizes the Kingdom’s self-image as a spiritual leader of the international Muslim community.17 This status provides an incentive for Saudi Arabia to actively counter perceived threats from Shia movements, often supported by Iran, to maintain its dominance as the global Sunni leader.

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Conversely, as Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed AlAnsari describe, Iran’s Velayat-e faqih doctrine imbues its regime with a Shia-centric revolutionary zeal. As such, support for Shia militias and movements, such as those in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, are an integral part of its broader strategy to champion “the oppressed” against Sunni hegemony.18 This struggle for religious primacy is not limited to ideological contestation but translates into proxy wars in fragile states.19 For instance, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen, framed as a campaign to counter Iranian influence through the Houthi movement, is essentially a desire to suppress Shia empowerment which would threaten its religious hegemony.20 Similarly, Iran’s backing of Shia-aligned forces in Syria and Iraq reflects its commitment to expanding its religious and political influence under the guise of protecting Shia communities.21 Thus, the civil wars in the MENA region reveal quite a consistent pattern: they served as battlegrounds for a larger religious and political rivalry. This pattern is exemplified by Saudi Arabia and Iran’s leveraging of their religious identities to assert dominance in Yemen’s fragile domestic politics. 

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However, while religion played a role, the primary concern for Saudi Arabia was not theological alignment but the preservation of regional power. In the North Yemen War of 1962, this is demonstrated by the mere fact that Saudi Arabia is a Wahhabi Sunni Kingdom that supported a Zaydi Shiite Kingdom against a secular republic. Notably, Wahhabi Sunni orthodoxy—which emphasizes a strict, literal interpretation of the Quran and Hadith—stands in stark contrast to Zaydi Shiism, which values reason and self-reflection over strict adherence to literal interpretations of religious texts.22 If religion were the primary concern, Saudi Arabia, as a Sunni kingdom, would not have supported a Zaydi Shiite regime. Saudi Arabia viewed Nasser’s pan-Arabism as an ideological and political threat, one that sought to topple monarchies across the Arab world and replace them with secular republics.23 Therefore, this intervention was not a religious crusade but a defensive measure aimed at protecting the Kingdom’s monarchy and transcending sectarian goals. 

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In 2015, religion ultimately served as a tool to legitimize intervention, as Saudi Arabia framed its support for the Yemeni monarchy as a defense of traditional Islamic values—despite the true motivation being the preservation of regional hegemony.24 As May Darwich argues, the Sunni-Shia proxy war narrative pushed by Saudi media is a distorted construction designed to cover Saudi Arabia’s underlying goal of maximizing power.25 The Kingdom, while promoting the idea of a religious divide, is primarily concerned with preserving its dominance over its southern neighbour located on the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the south entrance of the Red Sea, making it an essential piece in Saudi foreign policy.26 Moreover, religion alone cannot explain Iran’s intervention in Yemen because the Houthis and Iran diverge significantly in theology and religious practice. The Houthis, who follow Zaydism, a branch of Shi’a Islam closer to Sunni practices, do not adhere to Iran’s Twelver Shi’a beliefs, nor do they recognize the Iranian Supreme Leader as their religio-political authority.27 The relationship between Iran and the Houthis is better understood through their shared adversaries—namely, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel—rather than any deep theological alignment.28 Thus, Iran’s support is driven by the pursuit of influence in the region, with the Houthis as the proxy to counterbalance Saudi and Western dominance, rather than religion in itself.

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One can therefore argue that sectarian rhetoric in MENA interventions often functions less as the true cause of foreign involvement and more as a political instrument used by regional powers to legitimize strategic competition, mobilize domestic and regional support, and mask underlying geopolitical ambitions.

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The Post-Colonial Race to Regional Hegemony 

Since religion does not suffice to explain why MENA states intervene in one another’s civil wars, one may argue that the race to regional hegemony, especially after decolonization left a power vacuum in the Middle East, is a relevant factor in explaining interventions. The instability left behind by colonialism created a power vacuum that required states to assert themselves through self-affirming frameworks, such as revolutionary nationalism or religious legitimacy, to gain political authority at the fall of colonial institutions.29 Without a unifying colonial authority, regional dominance was a central objective for states striving to fill this power void. Thus, tensions over the role of regional hegemon in the post-colonial Middle East readily increased the longer the position remained vacant. 

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After Yemen gained independence in 1962, the YAR was established in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. With pro-monarchy groups emerging in the north, the question of whether Yemen would adopt a secular Nasserist model or a religious monarchy became central to the race for regional hegemony between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Yemen, as a newly independent nation, was susceptible to various ideological influences, and Saudi Arabia, much like Egypt, aimed to ensure it aligned with its vision for the region. It is also central to situate the Yemen intervention within the context of the fall of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961, which represented Nasser’s pan-Arabism and thus made its failure a stain on Nasserist ideology. After this humiliation, Nasser aimed to restore his image through intervention.30 Notably, he chaired the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a key post-colonial movement against imperialism, from 1964 to 1970. Therefore, Britain’s support for Saudi Arabia made the confrontation between Egypt and Bahrain in Yemen even more symbolic, as Egypt would be fighting against its former colonizer.31 

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Nasser’s 1962 intervention in Yemen thus exemplifies the competition to become a regional hegemon in post-colonial MENA. He portrayed Egypt as the leader of the Arab revolutionary movement, justifying the deployment of 60,000 troops to Yemen in a “life-or-death” struggle against what he considered “reactionary” monarchies like Saudi Arabia.32 Seeking to establish itself as a regional hegemon, Nasser’s anti-British and pro-republican Egypt viewed Yemen’s republican forces as an opportunity to support one more pan-Arabist secular country in the Middle East. He considered the republican forces’ victory as a victory of Egypt’s own, serving as a promotion of Nasserist ideology and thereby Egyptian regional hegemony. On the other hand, this posed an existential threat to the Saudi Kingdom, as it could not tolerate having an anti-monarchy and anti-religion state on its border. 

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Therefore, one could argue that these competing visions led MENA states to intervene in one another’s civil wars. These interventions, essentially, may be taken on by MENA states to secure their position as the regional hegemonic country and ideology in a space that is marked by a lack of hegemonic actors.

International Sponsorship: The Hand of Interventions

While the competition for regional dominance in the post-colonial Middle East provides much of the motivation behind MENA states’ interventions, the role of international sponsors adds another incentive to intervene. Ultimately, it is external powers who offer the financial, military, and ideological support that makes these interventions possible. Essentially, when Middle Eastern states intervene in the civil wars of neighbouring states their actions are driven not only by their national interests but also by the objectives of their patron states. 

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For instance, Egypt in 1962 did not only deploy soldiers on the ground in Yemen to spread Nasserism and establish Egypt as a regional hegemon; it did so because it equally worked in the interest of the USSR, which provided Egypt with the resources necessary to deploy troops in Yemen. The Soviet Union’s decision to support Egypt’s intervention in Yemen was rooted in a shared ideological alignment with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s vision for the Arab world. Particularly, his anti-imperialist and socialist leanings ideologically resonated with Soviet objectives during the Cold War.33 While Nasser sought to spread anti-imperialism and socialist ideals, the USSR supported Egypt because it aligned with Khrushchev’s view that the socialist camp had a duty to help countries fighting against colonial domination, even if they were not yet socialist.34 To enable Egypt’s intervention, the Soviets provided essential resources, including long-range Antonov-12 transport planes, which Egypt lacked.35 Soviet pilots flew the warplanes and trained Egyptian personnel, which ensured Egypt could sustain its operations in Yemen. This quick response from Moscow was motivated by its desire to strengthen its influence in the Middle East and counter Western power. This demonstrates that Egypt’s intervention was as much about fulfilling Soviet strategic goals as it was about Nasser’s regional ambitions. 

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International sponsorship of regional intervention serves as the elaboration of shared goals of both patrons and clients. In this case, Nasser and the USSR’s shared socialist and secular goals were arguably the driving force behind the Egypt-led, USSR-funded intervention in Yemen. 

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Alternatively, patron states may rely on their client groups to fight their battles. This dynamic is displayed in the relationship between Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. Direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be highly detrimental due to the significant economic and geopolitical risks involved. Both nations are major oil producers, and any conflict would disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 30% of the world’s oil passes.36 Such a disruption would lead to soaring global oil prices, adversely affecting both economies and the international market. Yet, they are two ideologically opposed countries. The ideological warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran stems from their differing visions of political systems and their competition for regional dominance. Iran’s Khomeinist ideology, which rejects monarchy and formalizes clerical authority in politics while promoting a populist agenda, is antithetical to Saudi Arabia’s monarchy, which upholds a traditional, autocratic system.37 Saudi Arabia and Iran’s differences are further intensified by their diverging stances on Western presence in the region: Saudi Arabia pursues normalization and favorable relations with the West, while Iran completely rejects it and advocates for anti-Israel and anti-Western policies.38 The previous differences fuel their rivalry, as both seek to assert their leadership and influence over the Middle East.39 This is why it is essential for Saudi Arabia and Iran to carry out their ideological warfare through a proxy, that being Yemen’s Houthis. 

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Iran’s support for the Houthis is a clear example of how patron-client relationships shape interventions in Middle Eastern civil wars. Iran has been the only foreign supporter of the Houthis, providing them with significant financial, humanitarian, and military aid, including advanced anti-tank missile systems and sophisticated ballistic missile technology.40 This demonstrates that the very reason Houthis’ warfare with Saudi Arabia is made possible is because Iran arms the Houthis. Saudi Arabia and Iran need the Houthis to carry out their ideological warfare without disrupting their economies. On the other end, non-state actors such as the Houthis need patrons like Iran to sponsor their ideas for Yemen. Thus, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran does not manifest in direct military confrontation but is instead waged through influence over the fragile political systems of weaker states in the region, such as Yemen.41

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This proxy strategy reflects broader patterns of influence in the Middle East which had been characterized as the heir of the “Arab Cold War” of the 1950s and 1960s by Malcolm Kerr.42 Similar to this earlier period, the power of regional protagonists is measured by their ability to manipulate domestic political struggles in weaker states where local regimes struggle to maintain control. In this context, non-state actors like the Houthis are essential for advancing the agendas of patron states. This is also applicable to other fragile states such as Syria, where superpowers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia sway domestic politics their way. MENA states may therefore intervene in other states’ civil wars in order to carry out their ideological contests, specifically targeting fragile states already prone to influence.43 

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Conclusion

This paper concludes that while religion may constitute a factor for MENA states to intervene in one another’s civil wars—as seen with Saudi Arabia’s Operation Decisive Storm in 1962 preventing the rise of a secular republic in Yemen, the spread of secularism which drove Egypt to intervene in Yemen that same year, and Saudi Arabia’s intervention to stop Shia Houthi governance post-Arab Spring in 2015—it does not suffice to explain repeated interventions. This paper offers alternative reasons for MENA intervention, grounded in a realist perspective. It argues that the ultimate goal of states intervening is to attain power by assuming the role of regional hegemon, a position left vacant after decolonization. States torn by civil wars provide an opportunity for MENA states to install leadership with similar ideologies, thereby contributing to regional hegemony. This is evident in Nasser’s attempt to establish a secular Nasserist republic in 1962 Yemen, in contrast with Saudi Arabia’s effort to install a religious monarchy that would not challenge Nasser’s status quo and regional hegemony, particularly at its border. 

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Finally, this paper argues that without the interdependent relationship of patron states, client states, and non-state actors, interventions would not be necessary. This is demonstrated by the 2015 intervention in which Saudi Arabia and Iran used Yemen’s civil war as a non-economically disruptive means to confront one another ideologically. The Houthis needed Iran’s patronage to wage a civil war against the government of President Hadi and its allies, namely Saudi Arabia. Similarly, in the 1962 North Yemen Civil War, the USSR needed Egypt to succeed in installing a socialist secular republic; this is substantiated by their simple flow of aid to Egypt. 

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This paper’s larger purpose is to illuminate how MENA states may use religion and ideology as surface-level justifications to intervene in other MENA states’ civil wars, when essentially, they do this to maximize power. Their ultimate motivation is to achieve regional hegemony while also helping their patron states secure regional or even global dominance. This is evident in Egypt’s contribution to the USSR’s global influence during the Cold War. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Houthi takeover is not solely based on ideological disagreement with the Houthi-Iranian, anti-American, and anti-Western sentiment. It is also driven by Saudi Arabia’s ideological alignment with, and desire to promote, Western sentiment across the region, aiming to prevent global anti-Western sentiment from spreading out of Yemen.

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FOOTNOTES

  1. Asher Orkaby, Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68, (Oxford University Press, 2017), 179-180.
  2.   Moosa Elayah et al., “National Dialogues as an Interruption of Civil War – the Case of Yemen,” Peacebuilding 8, no. 1 (2020): 98117, https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1517964.
  3.  Amadeus Marzai, “Nasser’s Ideology vs Practice: Postcolonial Critique of Egypt’s Yemen Intervention,” E-International Relations, July 7, 2023, https://www.e-ir.info/2023/07/07/nassers-ideology-vs-practice.
  4.  Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, “Federalism in Yemen: A Catalyst for War, the Present Reality, and the Inevitable Future,” Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies, February 28, 2019, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/7124.
  5.  Aso M Ali, “Yemen (1962–1970): Failure by a Military Coup,” in State Failure, Power Expansion, and Balance of Power in the Middle East: The Struggle over Failed States (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 67–93, https://doi.org/10.1007/9783031446337_3.
  6.  Al-Deen, “Federalism in Yemen.” 
  7. 8. 9. Elham Manea, “The Yemeni Civil War: the Arab Spring, State Formation and Internal Instability,” Middle Eastern Studies 61, no. 2 (2024): 319–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2024.2437628.  
  1.  Manea, “The Yemeni Civil War,” 122.
  2. Afshon Ostovar, “Iran, Its Clients, and the Future of the Middle East: The Limits of Religion,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 94, no. 6 (2018): 1237–56, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48587422.
  3.  “The Proxy of My Proxy: Saudi Arabia vs. Egypt in North Yemen,” Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, n.d., https://adst.org/2015/07/the-proxy-of-my-proxy-saudi-arabia-against-egypt-in-north-yemen/.
  4.  Ariel Jahner, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf,” The International Affairs Review, n.d., https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/l6vkmgjzj5sk9nsb56l3e8t9u3dnuu.
  5.  Robert St. John, “Gamal Abdel Nasser | Biography & Facts,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, January 11, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser.
  6.  16. 17. Simon Mabon, The Struggle for Supremacy in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023),
  7. ibid., 58.
  8. ibid., 67.
  1.  Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed AlAnsari, The 2017 Gulf Crisis : An Interdisciplinary Approach, (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021), 170, 231, https://doi.org/10.1007/9789811587351_14.
  2.  F. Gregory Gause III, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War (Brookings Doha Center, no. 11, July 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/English-PDF-1.pdf.
  3.  May Darwich, “The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status,” Insight Turkey 20, no. 2 (2018): 129, https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018202.08.
  4.  Mabon, The Struggle for Supremacy, 238.
  5. ibid., 17.
  6.  “The Proxy of My Proxy: Saudi Arabia vs. Egypt in North Yemen.” 
  7. 25. 26. Darwich, “The Saudi Intervention,” 125-41.
  8. 28.  Ostovar, Beyond the Arab Cold War, 1250.
  1.  Samuel Helfont, “Post-Colonial States and the Struggle for Identity in the Middle East since World War Two,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 23, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/post-colonial-states-and-the-struggle-for-identity.
  2.  Marzai, “Nasser’s Ideology vs Practice.”
  3.  Manea, “The Yemeni Civil War,” 122.
  4.  Malcolm H. Kerr,  The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 7.  
  5.  Jesse Ferris, “Soviet Support for Egypt’s Intervention in Yemen,” Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 4 (2008): 71-72, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2008.10.4.5.
  6. ibid., 90.
  7. ibid., 5.
  8.  “Strait of Hormuz Factsheet,” International Energy Agency, n.d., https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/203eb8eb-2147-4c99-af07-2d3804b8db3f/StraitofHormuzFactsheet.pdf.
  9.  Jahner, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf.” 
  10.  Mabon, The Struggle for Supremacy, 242.
  11.  Jahner, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf.” 
  12.  Ostovar, Beyond the Arab Cold War, 1249-1250.
  13. 42. 43.  Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, 1. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ali, Aso M, “Yemen (1962–1970): Failure by a Military Coup.” In State Failure, Power Expansion, and Balance of Power in the Middle East: The Struggle over Failed States, 67–93. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783031446337_3.

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. n.d. “The Proxy of My Proxy: Saudi Arabia vs. Egypt in North Yemen – Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training.” https://adst.org/2015/07/the-proxy-of-my-proxy-saudi-arabia-against-egypt-in-north-yemen/.

Darwich, May. “The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status.” Insight Turkey 20, no. 2 (2018): 125–41. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018202.08.

Elayah, Moosa, Lau Schulpen, Van Kempen, Ahamad Almaweri, Blikis AbuOsba, and Bakeel Alzandani. “National Dialogues as an Interruption of Civil War – the Case of Yemen.” Peacebuilding 8, no. 1 (2020): 98117. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1517964.

Gause, F. Gregory, III. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Brookings Doha Center, no. 11, July 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/English-PDF-1.pdf.

Ferris, Jesse. “Soviet Support for Egypt’s Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1963.” Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 4 (2008): 536. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2008.10.4.5.

Jahner, Ariel. “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf.” The International Affairs Review, n.d. https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/l6vkmgjzj5sk9nsb56l3e8t9u3dnuu.

Kerr, Malcolm H. The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 

Mabon, Simon. The Struggle for Supremacy in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108603690.

Manea, Elham. “The Yemeni Civil War: the Arab Spring, State Formation and Internal Instability.” Middle Eastern Studies 61, no. 2 (2024): 319–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2024.2437628

Marzai, Amadeus. “Nasser’s Ideology vs Practice: Postcolonial Critique of Egypt’s Yemen Intervention.” E-International Relations, July 7, 2023. https://www.e-ir.info/2023/07/07/nassers-ideology-vs-practice-postcolonial-critique-of-egypts-yemen-intervention/.

Orkaby, Asher. Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68. Oxford University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190618445.001.0001.

Ostovar, Afshon. “Iran, Its Clients, and the Future of the Middle East: The Limits of Religion.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 94, no. 6 (2018): 1237–56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48587422.

Robert St. John. “Gamal Abdel Nasser | Biography & Facts.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, January 11, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser.

Helfont, Samuel. “Post-Colonial States and the Struggle for Identity in the Middle East since World War Two.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 23, 2015. https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/post-colonial-states-and-the-struggle-for-identity.

Al-Deen, Maysaa Shuja. “Federalism in Yemen: A Catalyst for War, the Present Reality, and the Inevitable Future.” Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies, February 28, 2019. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/7124.

“Strait of Hormuz Factsheet.” International Energy Agency, n.d. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/203eb8eb-2147-4c99-af07-2d3804b8db3f/StraitofHormuzFactsheet.pdf.

Zweiri, Mahjoob, and Majed AlAnsari. In The 2017 Gulf Crisis : An Interdisciplinary Approach, edited by Mahjoob Zweiri, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Arwa Kamal. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/9789811587351_14.